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IF I HAD A HAMMER: WHY PERMITTING
CHALLENGES DO NOT FIT IN THE FIGHT
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Elizabeth M. Georges*
There is an old saying - when the only tool you have
is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail. The
point being that often we become so intent on applying a
certain solution that we fail to recognize that the solu-
tion does not really get at the problem. As every week-
end carpenter or do-it-yourself auto mechanic will tell
you, if you persist too long in using the wrong tool, you
can strip a screw, round off the comers of a lug nut,
and turn a fixable problem into an unfixable mess.
Low income, minority communities are disproportion-
ately exposed to the adverse effects of pollution.' The
* Elizabeth Georges is an Associate in the Litigation De-
partment of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker. The author
wishes to express deep appreciation to Mr. Gerald Yamada,
for his insights in the preparation of this Essay. This Essay
is based on a speech delivered by Ms. Georges at the Ford-
ham Environmental Law Journal Symposium on Environ-
mental Justice on March 3, 1999.
1. The literature discussing the statistical frequency
with which waste facilities are sited in low income or minority
communities is extensive. See, e.g., Vicki Been and Francis
Gupta, Coming to the Nuisance or Going to the Barrios: A
Longitudinal Analysis of Environmental Justice Claims, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1997); Terrance J. Certner et al., Environ-
mental Justice and Toxic Release: Establishing Evidence of
Discriminatory Effect Based on Race and Not Income, 3 WIs.
ENVTL L.J. 119 (1996) (discussing both studies done by the
authors and studies reviewed by the authors). While some of
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environmental justice movement has determined that
too many facilities that emit hazardous substances are
being located in neighborhoods that are largely popu-
lated by African-Americans or other people of color.2
However, the environmental justice movement has had
little success trying to influence where these sources are
located, using the legal system.3
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI")4 is a
powerful statute in the fight against discrimination.
these studies debate the accuracy of the methodology used or
the legal applicability of the data, the majority of the studies
confirm that at present, a disproportionate number of low-
income minority communities serve as "hosts" to solid and
hazardous waste facilities.
2. In a recent pre-meeting report prepared by Frances
A. Dubrowski for the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("USEPA") in anticipation of the November 1999
meeting of the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council ("NEJAC"), ("1999 Pre-Meeting Report") Ms. Dubrow-
ski interviewed a variety of stakeholders regarding the per-
mitting process and environmental justice. The stakeholders
interviewed, including industry, acknowledged that the role
of environmental justice in the permitting process ranges
from important to extremely important. See 1999 Pre-
Meeting Report, at 6.
3. Generally, actions in courts alleging racial discrimi-
nation on the basis of where a permitted facility is located
have met with little success. See, e.g., Bean v. Southern
Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex.
1977); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n. v. Macoa-Bibb
County Planning & Zoning Comm., 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D.
Ga. 1989). Although court cases have been largely fruitless,
community activism, sometimes referred to as "the court of
public opinion," has often had an impact. The most publi-
cized victory of this kind is the campaign of the residents of
Convent, Louisiana, who succeeded in convincing officials of
Japanese vinyl manufacturer Shintech, Inc. to downsize and
relocate their proposed facility. See Company Evades Envi-
ronmental Racism Test, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1998.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7. (1964) [hereinafter "Ti-
tle VI"].
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However, EPA's Title VI Interim Guidance (the "Interim
Guidance")5 is not the correct tool for the job. Indeed,
the paralyzation has become so acute that the Title VI
Implementation Advisory Committee convened by EPA
Administrator Carol Browner (the "Title VI Committee")
could do no more in their draft report to EPA than agree
to disagree regarding the best means to implement Title
VI within the permitting process.6
Title VI has two parts. The first part makes it a condi-
tion of receiving federal funds that a covered "program
or activity" must not engage in intentional discrimina-
tion.7 Section 602 of Title VI allows federal agencies to
promulgate rules to terminate funding of programs or
activities that engage in discrimination, whether inten-
tional or unintentional. 8 The state agency authorized to
administer an environmental permitting statute receives
federal funds for its permit program, conditional on the
agency's will to comply with Title VI. 9 Thus, while Title
5. See United States Environmental Protection Agency,
Interim Guidance for Investigating Title VI Administrative
Complaints Challenging Permits (1998). ("Title VI Interim
Guidance").
6. See National Advisory Council for Environmental
Policy and Technology, Report of the Title VI Implementation
Advisory Committee: Next Steps for EPA, State, and Local En-
vironmental Justice Programs 1-9 (March 1, 1999).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(1) (1964). "Program or activ-
ity" is defined at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4x (1964).
8. See id. § 2000(d)(2).
9. The major federal environmental statutes that require
operating permits are: Title V of the Clean Air Act ("Clean Air
Act" or "CAA"), the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System program ("NPDES") unde'r the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), and the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act
("RCRA") program. They each offer states the opportunity to
obtain "authorization" to administer the statute. See 42
U.S.C. § 7411 (state implementation and enforcement under
CAA); 33 U.S.C. § 1316(c) (State enforcement of standards of
performance under the CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (authoriza-
tion of state hazardous waste programs under RCRA). States
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VI cannot expand an agency's decision-making author-
ity, it may constrain the agency from engaging in dis-
crimination with respect to the decisions it is authorized
to make. 10
must usually apply to obtain the authorization, and as part
of the authorization, receive federal grant money. See 40
C.F.R. § 52.21. In nearly every instance where EPA may
grant authorization to administer a statute, EPA retains
oversight authority over enforcement initiatives and requires
that the state program be at least as restrictive as the federal
rules. See id. States are not required to obtain authorization
to administer federal environmental programs. For example,
RCRA in the State of Iowa is administered directly by EPA
Region 8, because Iowa has not requested authorization to
administer RCRA.
10. The operative test used to determine whether a pri-
vate right of action may be implied from a statute is found in
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Among the factors in Cort is
the requirement that the private right of action must comport
with the overall legislative scheme of the statute. Id. at 82-
84. In the case of environmental permitting statutes, a pri-
vate right of action under Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act
does not comport with the legislative scheme because it in-
appropriately adds criteria to the permitting statute. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that actions under Title VI
tailor themselves closely to what it is within the scope of the
"program or activity" receiving federal financial assistance.
See United States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed
Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597 (1986). It is therefore in-
appropriate to consider acts that lie outside of the agency's
authority to be part of the "program or activity" that engen-
ders Title VI liability.
This is consistent with holdings in appellate courts that
have rejected efforts by EPA to require consultation with the
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") and the National Marine
Fisheries Service ("NMFS") on endangered species issues be-
fore granting water discharge permits as a condition of the
delegation of the NPDES program under Section 402 of the
CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)-(9); see also American Forest
and Paper Association v. United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998). In American
Forest, EPA threatened to veto any Louisiana state permit
PERMI7TING CHALLENGES
The fundamental problem with the Title VI Interim
Guidance is its inconsistency with the way in which en-
vironmental permitting statutes usually regulate. In
theory, permitting statutes like RCRA, Title V of the
Clean Air Act, and the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") program regulate the op-
erations of facilities to control the discharge of pollut-
ants to the environment.1' The standards, which are
usually promulgated by the EPA, are supposed to pro-
tect human health and the environment. 12 In other
that was not modified to the satisfaction of either FWS or
NMFS's satisfaction. The Court held that EPA had no
authority to require Louisiana to consult with FWS or NMFS
on endangered species protection, nor could it veto a water
discharge permit based on the failure to adopt FWS or
NMFS's advice, because the protection of endangered species
is not an enumerated criteria in CWA Section 402. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342. The Court further held that nothing in the Endan-
gered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536, grants EPA the author-
ity to add criteria to those listed in CWA Section 402(b). See
id.
11. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §1311 (a) (stating that under the
CWA any noncompliant discharge is in violation of law); 42
U.S.C. § 6925 (requiring all owners and operators of a facility
under RCRA to obtain a permit); 42 U.S.C. §7661(a) (making
it unlawful under the CAA to operate a major source without
a permit where a Title V permit program is in place).
12. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (granting the Admin-
istrator authority to promulgate regulations establishing
such performance standards, applicable to owners and op-
erators of facilities for the treatment, storage, or disposal of
hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter,
as may be necessary to protect human health and the envi-
ronment). But see 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (stating that in certain
instances, the Administrator is confined to "technology-based
standards," such as the requirement under the CWA that ef-
fluent limitations be set at levels consistent with applications
of the best practicable control technology). It is axiomatic in
administrative law that federal agencies, which derive their
authority from Article II of the Constitution, may only receive
the authority delegated to them by the Congress. See Tank-
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words, they restrict a facility's operations, the types and
quantities of material that can be used, where and how
long wastes may be stored, and what kinds of control
technologies, like scrubbers or treatment plants, must
be installed. 13 Whereas the EPA standards regulate the
activities at the facility, they do not regulate the decision
of where to locate the facility.14 That decision usually
belongs to the permittee, subject to local zoning con-
straints.
Some programs can influence the location of facilities
by adjusting the total amount of permitted discharge
based on location. 15 Examples of these types of pro-
grams are the Prevention of Significant Deterioration
program ("PSD program") under the Clean Air Act,16 and
the Total Maximum Daily Limit program ("TMDL pro-
gram") under the Clean Water Act. 17 These programs
can increase control requirements, usually based on
uniform health-based criteria. 18 These standards set a
total limit on the amount of a pollutant in an area, and
require that all the collective sources within that area
sley v. Garrelt, 174 B.R. 434 (Bankr. W.D. Va 1994). Moreo-
ver, this delegation of authority has specific parameters so
that agency decisions may be measured against the agency's
authority. It is arguable that an attempt by the EPA to utilize
standards for decision-making in the permit context that look
beyond general protection of human health and the environ-
ment is "arbitrary and capricious" because it exceeds EPA's
authority.
13. See generally 10 C.F.R. § 600.116 (2000) (RCRA);
see also 18 C.F.R. § 1313.5 (2000) (CAA); 15 C.F.R. §
922.134 (CWA).
14. See id.
15. See infra notes 16-18.
16. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1980) (Prevention of Signifi-
cant Deterioration under the CAA).
17. See 33 U.S.C. § 303d (1981) (Water-quality based
TMDL standards as part of NPDES program).
18. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1977) (CWA); see also 42
U.S.C. § 7661 (1990)(CAA).
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remain within that total limit. 19 The overall effect, ide-
ally, is to force sources within a control area to collec-
tively limit the amount of pollutants that are exposed to
the residents within the control area. 20
Under the environmental statutes, a state agency does
not have the authority to tell a permittee where to locate
a facility based on non-health, non-uniform factors. 21
This is the fundamental disconnect between the com-
plaint process outlined in the Interim Guidance and the
environmental permit statutes. To make the Title VI
Interim Guidance work, the environmental permit stat-
utes and the administering agency must assume
authority that the statute has not given them and was
not drafted to let them have.22 If the Interim Guidance
has not been effective in achieving environmental jus-
tice, and the stakeholders uniformly agree on that point,
it is in large part because of this structural inconsis-
tency. 23
The relatively uneventful success of the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act ("NEPA)24 is further evidence that
19. See supra note 17.
20. Although the control areas in the PSD and TMDL
programs are in theory a good start towards addressing the
cumulative effects of pollution in minority communities,
there are limitations. The control areas in these statutes are
usually not small enough to rectify issues of environmental
justice. TMDLs are usually based on a body of surface water,
such as a specific river or lake. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1972).
EPA is in fact, moving from setting TMDLs based on a "wa-
tershed" system that looks to the interconnected surface wa-
ters formed naturally in land basins. See 64 F.R. 46012
(1992).
21. See generally 33 U.S.C.S. § 2001(4).
22. See supra note 8.
23. See 1999 Pre-Meeting Report, supra note 2, at 4.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4370 (1970). For the NEPA
Guidance see Environmental Protection Agency, Final Guid-
ance for Incorporating Environmental Justice Concerns in
EPA's NEPA Compliance Analysis 23 (April 1, 1998)
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this "structural disconnect" is what renders the Title VI
Interim Guidance ineffective. The NEPA Guidance, fi-
nalized in April 1998, requires considerations of envi-
ronmental justice to be incorporated into every envi-
ronmental impact statement and environmental as-
sessment performed as part of the NEPA process. 25 Un-
like the Title VI Interim Guidance regarding environ-
mental permitting, the NEPA Guidance has passed from
proposal to acceptance to implementation with relatively
few major disputes. 26 In contrast, the permitting guid-
ance has languished in various stages of drafting. 27
There is an obvious fit between the concerns of envi-
ronmental justice and NEPA's mandate. NEPA's man-
date is that all major federal actions with significant en-
vironmental impact receive a "hard look" in the form of
an environmental impact statement. 28 Unlike environ-
mental permitting statutes, NEPA does not regulate ac-
tivities or operations; it regulates the decision-making
process itself.29
The irony of the Title VI debate is that EPA did not
want to take the same approach as with NEPA to apply
environmental justice in its permitting programs. EPA
<http://es.epa.gov/ocea/ofa/ ejepa.html>. The NEPA Guid-
ance serves as a guide to incorporate environmental justice
goals into the EPA's preparation of environmental impact
statements and environmental assessments under NEPA.
See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 6.
27. EPA's Office of Civil Rights has again distributed a
redrafted guidance document to the Regions for comment.
EPA has indicated plans to release the Guidance for public
comment sometime next year. See EPA Civil Rights Investiga-
tion Guidance Will Likely Remain Unchanged, INSIDE EPA, Vol
20, No. 46 (Nov. 19, 1999).
28. See National Environmental Protection Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4332(c) [hereinafter "NEPA"].
29. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989).
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long ago took the position and defended it successfully
in appellate courts that NEPA does not apply to the act
of granting an environmental permit. 30 This approach is
unfortunate, because where NEPA is applied, it is an
ideal vehicle for assuring discrimination plays no part in
where pollution sources are located. NEPA is designed
to provide the deliberate process that environmental
justice concerns require - an in-depth evaluation of the
potential impacts of the proposed action and a thorough
analysis of alternatives. 3' Unlike permitting statutes,
NEPA's structure lends itself readily to environmental
justice considerations. That may be why the NEPA
Guidance has met with less opposition.
All people should be equally protected from the
harmful effects of pollution. If the environmental per-
mitting statutes are ill equipped to fix the problem
posed by the environmental justice movement, what is
the appropriate solution? Contrary to the belief of activ-
ists, permitted facilities do not cause health problems
and environmental degradation. Rather, these effects
stem from the nature and the amount of discharge the
facilities release into the environment. Consequently,
the important issue is not the number of facilities in any
given neighborhood, but rather the number of pollut-
ants released. This is where the permitting statutes
may be able to help. The permitting statutes may not
address the location of facilities, but they do control the
discharge of pollutants into the environment. 32  Most
30. See, e.g., State of Ala. ex rel. Siegelman v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 911 F.2d 499 (1 1th
Cir. 1990).
31. See NEPA, supra note 28.
32. Each of the permitting statutes set discharge limi-
tations on the permitted substances, where discharge is
permitted. See 18 C.F.R. § 1316.5 (CWA); see also 15 C.F.R.
§ 922.134. Where discharge is not permitted, (in the RCRA
program) the permit specifies appropriate treatment, storage
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pollution control statutes grant their permits based on
health-based standards. 33
The permitting statutes may reduce some of the re-
sistance from industry stakeholders by insisting on
equality in the use of health-based standards. The most
substantial issue for permit holders is that in their view,
the Interim Guidance as it is currently devised, essen-
tially turns every permit application process into a fed-
erally-mandated zoning inquiry that was not contem-
plated in the environmental statutes. 34 Moreover, be-
cause the Interim Guidance currently applies to renew-
als, the Interim Guidance revisits siting decisions that
may have taken place decades ago. 35 The siting deci-
sion, whether it was made 40 years ago or 40 days ago,
was never part of the permitting process. It is much
more difficult for permit holders to argue against permit
criteria aimed at protecting the health of the communi-
ties in which they operate, since that criteria has always
been part of the permit process.3 6 Indeed, that is the
reason for issuing permits in the first place.
If environmental justice is written into the permit re-
quirements, individuals will not need to protect their
rights against unintentional discrimination in federal
court through Title VI. Enforcing environmental justice
through discharge and emission standards contained in
permits neutralizes the availability of a private right of
action under Section 602 of Title VI, an idea left open by
Chester Residents.37 A private right of action already
and handling of specific substances. See 10 C.F.R. § 600.116
(RCRA).
33. See id.
34. See 1999 Pre-Meeting Report, supra note 2, at 6.
35. See Title VI Interim Guidance, supra note 5.
36. See supra note 24.
37. Chester Residents v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925 (3rd Cir.
1997) (dismissed on grounds of mootness). The issue in this
case was whether or not a private right of action for uninten-
tional discrimination exists under Section 602 of Title VI.
There is an explicit private right of action under Section 601
PERMITTING CHALLENGES
exists to sue a facility that is discharging more pollut-
ants that its permit allows. 38
Environmental injustice is an old problem, which peo-
ple have finally become serious about fixing. Environ-
mental justice is in fact a new frontier. Making it hap-
pen will require everyone, including the EPA, industry
and activists, to rethink the way they do things, and the
tools they use to do them. The Title VI Interim Guid-
ance, the way it is crafted right now, is inadequate. It is
not the right tool. We can continue to try and use an ill-
fitting tool, or we can go back to the toolbox and try to
find something better. We can create new tools, we can
use old tools in new ways. The only imperative is that
whatever tool we use must get the job done.
of Title VI. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(1). The Supreme Court has
not decided the question of whether a private right of action
for disparate impact, or unintentional discrimination, exists
under Section 602.
38. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972 (1980)(RCRA); 33
U.S.C.A § 6972 (1948)(CWA). Moreover, at least in the case
of the Clean Air Act, EPA initiatives such as the "credible evi-
dence rule" make it easier than ever for citizens to bring suit
against permit violators, because plaintiffs need not utilize
the specific data used by EPA to monitor compliance. Plain-
tiffs may use "any credible evidence" that a violation has oc-
curred. See Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 36,
8319 (1987).
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